As indicated in a previous issue of this newsletter, because the SFMTA deploys one and two-car trains in the Market Street subway instead of the four and five-car trains the multi-billion dollar facility was designed to accommodate, the subway and adjoining Muni Metro tunnels currently operate at less than half their peak- period carrying capacity. This unhappy situation was caused in the mid-1990’s by a breathtakingly short-sighted decision to stop forming four and five-car trains. 

Various reasons are cited for this enormously-consequential mistake, including pressure from the TWU (Muni operator’s union), coupling difficulties, maintenance problems, etc. but the most likely reason is that for reasons unknown, beginning in 1991 the then incoming Breda LRVs were arriving in San Francisco without the ability to couple LRVs together while in revenue service. Having reached the end of their useful life, the Breda’s are now being gradually replaced with new Siemens S200 LRVs, which began arriving in San Francisco in 2017.

In an effort to receive assurance that the Siemens car would at last allow the SFMTA to again begin using its subway effectively, Save Muni (www.savemuni.org), a San Francisco-based transit-advocacy group, sent several requests for information to the SFMTA during last August and September, followed up by a California Public Records Act/San Francisco Sunshine Ordinance request sent on November 5, 2019 asking for:

“1) All records from the past three years related to when the Muni Metro may be able to accommodate longer than two car trains

2) All records from the past three years related to tests of longer than two car trains in the ACTS territory, whether conducted by the MTA or outside contractors.”

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It’s been clear for decades that another way of crossing the Bay between Oakland and San Francisco will be needed when BART runs out of peak-period transbay carrying-capacity. It is now estimated that this capacity limit will be reached before 2030. Thankfully the “Powers” have at last begun their planning. However, given the glacial pace of Bay Area infrastructure development, the needed supplemental system won’t be up and running until 2060 or later. So how, one might ask, do Central Bay Area transit leaders plan to cope during the intervening 30 or more years? If anyone knows the answer to this rather important question, he or she is keeping mum on the subject.

Here are a few observations designed to speed things up:

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Last year BART conducted a survey of its riders. The survey results revealed that between 2014 and 2018 general rider satisfaction with BART dropped by 18%, from 74% to 56%. Rider responses were elicited in response to 46 separate elements of BART’s service. The Clipper Card got the highest rating. High ratings were also given to the availability of maps and schedules, on-time performance and the frequency of BART trains.

To most riders it will come as no great surprise to learn that conditions in BART stations, interior on-car noise levels and cleanliness were much farther down the list. And it will come as even less of a surprise that the very lowest ratings included BART’s lax enforcement of its fare evasion problem, and the absence of adequate BART policing at stations, on trains and in BART parking lots. At the very bottom of the list was the riders’ strongly negative reaction to BART’s failure to address its homeless problem.

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Here are excerpts from a dialogue that has been ongoing between the SFCTA and BATWG since the October 22, 2019 SFCTA hearing. It illustrates BATWG’s current assessment of the situation:

Excerpts from BATWG’s letter dated October 26^th to the SFCTA:

At the October 22, 2019 SFTCA hearing much was made of 2028, the year by which the trains would be allegedly be carrying passengers to and from the Salesforce Transit Center. [Based upon the delays that have already occurred and that are continuing to occur], 2030 or later would be more realistic.

In any event there are two dates of far more immediate importance that were not mentioned on 10/22.

First, when will [the SFCTA let] the Preliminary Engineering and PE cost estimating work be restarted? While [we] believe that Mark Zabeneh is ready and able to do the work we realize that he may be cashiered, unfairly in our view. So the question becomes, when will someone be given the authority and funding needed to commence preliminary engineering? When will the SFCTA get serious about restarting the DTX project?

Second, when will a bonafide preliminary engineering cost estimate be available for all to see? Given the uncertainties and confusion created by the past and continuing delays, the potential funding sources have understandably adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Clearly defining the project is an essential first step to restarting the project, and that requires a completed PE.

Excerpts from a subsequent exchange of letters between SFCTA and BATWG: Continue reading →